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Interview with Rex Ridenoure
April 9, 2011
Riverwoods Conference Center, Logan, UT.
Name: Rex W. Ridenoure
Date of Birth: May 23, 1956
Place of Birth: Phoenix, Arizona
Question: What’s your relationship with the Get Away Special team? Were you a student?
I worked up here at the Center for Atmospheric and Space Sciences at Utah State from
about December 1985 through August of ’86. I was, on paper, listed as a “research engineer”
which was kind of a made up title. About two-thirds of what I did here was interacting with the
Get Away Special activities that were going on at that time. There’s more of a story to that that
I’ll tell. The context was that I was a undergraduate at Iowa State University, Ames Iowa.
When I was a junior I was what they called a speaker manager for the local chapter of AIAA and
so my job was basically to follow up on some leads that professors in aerospace engineering
gave me for bringing in speakers from industry or government. Typically on a every month or so
basis. Somehow or another Gil Moore was one of those people sort of suggested as a speaker.
So I managed to arrange for him to come to our campus and this was, as it turned out, four years
before the Shuttle launched. So at that time Gil was an executive at Morton Thiokol here in
northern Utah and probably one of the best advocates for the Shuttle program on the whole
planet. He gave a terrific overview talk about what the Shuttle program was trying to
accomplish. As you know Gil Moore was very charismatic and still is. So I was so impressed
with the guy that we basically have kept in touch since. As I got started in my career and moved
out to California and so on and so on, met him at conferences occasionally, he and I just kept
communicating occasionally. So I worked about five years in the space business after I
graduated and I worked at Lockheed on the Hubble Space Telescope program and also down at
Hughes Space and Communications on communications satellites that were specifically designed
for the Shuttle. I sort of got tired of working on these big projects and so I was thinking of
working on smaller spacecraft, but I didn’t know what was going on really. Then in an Aviation
Week and Space Technology article there was this write up about the NuSat Program here at
Iowa State, or at Utah State. It quoted Gil Moore in the article and it had pictures of Hal Merritt
who was one of the technicians working on the satellite, assembling the small basketball sized
satellite. I said boy that sounds just like what I wanted to work on. So I called Gil and I said hey
Gil tell me what’s going on up there, this sounds pretty interesting. Turns out the campus had
just started deciding to spin off a small company from the campus effort working on these small
satellites. It was going to be in the research park here, which back then was, this was late ’85,
was just an empty field. The first building was just getting, they were scrapping the dirt for the
first building in late ’85 and there was a company that was going to go in there called GlobeSat.
I interviewed up here probably within two weeks after I found out about all this. Gil Moore set it
up to have me tour the facilities and talk about what their plans were. They decided they wanted
to hire me as a spacecraft systems engineer for GlobeSat. So I think within probably no more
than a month from the time I first placed that call I was up here moving into the valley in the
middle of December in the middle of a raging blizzard. I barely got into the valley, just barely,
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over the highway which back then was a two-lane highway going across the pass you know. So
my intent was fully to become a spacecraft systems engineer in a start up small spacecraft
company here in the Cache valley and it sounded really exciting. A month after I got here the
Shuttle, Challenger, blew up and I never actually even got processed in as an employee of
GlobeSat. The paperwork was still in the works. So once Shuttle blew up their entire business
plan at GlobeSat was based on Shuttle launched small satellites out of Get Away Special
canisters, so all that got put on hold. I was ready to work and I was willing to work and campus
had some money so I got hired in as a research engineer at the Center for Atmospheric and Space
Sciences. So then the question was what do I do and what they did was assign me to manage a
couple of contracts that had been funded by other sources. I think one was Thiokol and one was
the Air Force and they were Get Away Special experiments but not the GAS program
experiments. They were a little more mature and basically the focus of a PhD thesis for a couple
of guys and so that’s how I kind of got started and there’s more after that, but keep asking
questions.
Question: Do you remember any of the specific projects that you worked on?
Yeah, the first one which I was probably a little more involved in was the one funded by
Thiokol. It was, of course, funding that Gil Moore arranged through their Internal Research and
Development pool of funds in northern Utah. At that time Gil Moore was very interested in
learning how to blow bubbles in space and then cure them somehow so they would become a
solid sphere, very light weight spheres and he had this vision of having Get Away Special
canisters have equipment inside that would blow these bubbles, basically cure them so they
would be hard, then cut them off at the base and let them release out of the Shuttle’s Get Away
Specials and then they would use different size spheres as calibration devices for upper
atmospheric densities and things. The ballistic coefficients would be such that they would come
in very quickly. They were like beach balls, that’s the basic idea, beach ball sized bubbles. So
the research was in the lab here at the campus using all sorts of fancy surfactants which is a
fancy word for soap. Very slimly fluids that as you slowly blew air into a membrane of this fluid
stretched across a wire or something it would start blowing a huge bubble like kids do with soap
bubble blowing toys. We were trying to figure out how to do this repeatedly in a Get Away
Special in the vacuum of space and then cure them. The surfactants were such that, they were
going to be of a kind that first would blow a bubble and then as the ultraviolet radiation hit them
in space they would basically crystallize and turn into hard bubbles. It was pretty complicated
chemistry and vacuum physics and you know transition phase chemistry from fluids to, from
membranes to solids and none of that I had any background in. So I mostly stayed on top of the
schedule and the progress of the program and then some of the technical people here did the
actual technical work. But it wasn’t going that well at the time. The problem was as soon as you
put them in a vacuum typically the bubbles popped. They basically started evaporating, you
know, so that was going on. The key person involved was a very senior technician probably in
his sixties by then, or maybe even seventies, named Hal Merritt. He’s the guy featured in the
Aviation Week article I mentioned, is in the room, in the other room here, where he’s working on
the small satellite and that’s that guy. So he pretty much stayed in the lab and worked on the
experimental set up and the different runs they were doing. There was a chemist from Thiokol,
that I don’t remember the name of, who was actually the guy trying to pick the right chemistry.
He was like a PhD in chemistry with a very fancy background in that area. Gil was mostly
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making sure the funding was still in place and we were making the right judgments of where to
go next every week or so. So that’s the first one.
The other one was an Air Force funded experiment to basically test out some lasers. Back
then solid state lasers were just coming on line as devices you could use and very few
experiments had ever used them in space under the space radiation situation and also space
vacuum. There were quite a few applications proposed for these things to use for metrology and
all sorts of other applications for spacecrafts. So there was a PhD student here, originally from
Thailand, named Swat Tantiphanwadi and he was getting a PhD in EE, Electrical Engineering,
and he was the experiment’s principle investigator. Basically his job was to build up this
experiment and get it to work inside a single Get Away Special tray which would then be ganged
up with other trays, like Utah State is famous for, and launched in space. I was basically
managing his money and his schedule, but he was doing all the technical work. Those were the
two most familiar to me that I was working on.
Coincidentally, it had nothing to do with my job really, but my apartment mate at the time
was Scott Thomas, who by that time was already one of the most experienced Get Away Special
guys. He was a physics student finishing up his undergraduate degree. He was a senior at the
time, and he, of course, had already had several experiments launched in the Get Away Special
canisters. So he and I just became good friends and we still are, but I wasn’t involved with his
work at all. He was mostly trying to finish up his degree.
Question: So you weren’t a student yourself, but you interacted with quite a few GAS students?
Right. Yeah, in fact as soon as the Shuttle exploded that was in late January 1986 it took
about a month or a month-and-a-half before it all became clear that the Shuttle Program wasn’t
going to be launching anytime soon. You just didn’t know how long, but you could tell it was
going to be many months before they ever figured out what happened. So then the concern on
the part of Gil Moore and Rex Megill especially, and even the administration here at the campus,
was what are we going to do if the Shuttle is down for a year or two with this program? How are
we going to keep the students interested? How are we going to keep the funding coming in from
different sponsors like Thiokol and other companies and as these experiments get completed,
there were quite a few in the works, how are we going to get them launched them off and get
them done if there is no Shuttle. So then the concern was how do we keep the community
talking with each other and excited and engaged so this all doesn’t fizzle out. The momentum at
that time was huge, there was a lot of interest in this stuff. So a couple of things were basically
invented here at Utah State to make sure the momentum wasn’t lost.
The first one was Frank Redd, who at the time was the department chair of Mechanical
Engineering, was very good friends and colleagues of Gil Moore and Rex Megill. Rex was in
CASS, Gil Moore was, I think he was an adjunct professor here, but normally at Thiokol
working as an executive. So they had always wanted to have a space systems design course here
at the campus. There never had been one so they used this gap in everything, all the activity to
create the first course. So those three guys basically sketched a syllabus for the course which
was intended to be the Spring quarter back then. They basically sketched out what they wanted
it to cover and Gil, of course, is always full of ideas of Get Away Special ideas he wanted to
pursue. At the time there was a fairly serious concept for enlarging the canister from the normal
diameter, whatever it is, about what is it 25 inches or something, what ever the diameter is.
There was an idea back then to build a much wider canister but squatter. Not as long but much
wider, about twice the diameter and they called it the “fat can.” Since a fat can made out of solid
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stainless steel would be too heavy for the Shuttle, the idea was to get Thiokol to build the fat can
cylinder out of composites. So it would be very lightweight and then maybe put steel end plates
on it. But that thought was to open up much more volume for experimenters and use the same
basic architecture. Put some trays in it and do some cool flatter, squatter satellites inside. So Gil
Moore had an idea to from a fat can eject a small satellite that would have deployable wings on it
and do it in a very low orbit and have some propulsion on the satellite and dip it into the
atmosphere by changing its orbit make the perigee come down and make it pass through the
upper atmosphere and use the wings to actually change the plane of the orbit and then pop it out
of the atmosphere. It would be an elliptical orbit so every perigee would pass through at a few
tenths of a degree of plane change to the orbit and then come out again. Then the next time
around do it again and evidentially you get several degrees of plane change. So we focus the
first course not only on going through the space systems engineering process and mission
engineering process, but focus it on this fat can deployed small satellite that would dip into the
atmosphere. So we called that the Little Dipper. So that was our whole project to design this
Little Dipper spacecraft and mission concept. So some flyers, we didn’t have much time to put it
together because by the time this all came together was maybe March. I think the last quarter
started in early April or something. So some flyers were put around and some newsletters were
kind of sprinkled around campus to try to get some students signing up. I think we got about six
or seven of them, maybe eight. There were a couple of graduate students and the rest were
undergrads. So after Gil and Rex Megill and Frank Redd agreed on what the syllabus was going
to be, they turned it over to me and said ok you get to teach the course because I had almost
nothing to do at the time. I said I’ve never taught a course before and they said that’s ok, now is
a good time to start. I had been a spacecraft engineer and a mission engineer so at least I knew
some of the basic concepts. I ended up basically having to teach the course and have other
professors come in if I didn’t know the subject matter. I would get other professors come in and
teach that little module. But generally I had to coordinate all these students and get them on the
schedule so they could generate this preliminary design by the end of the session. The goal was
to get a preliminary design review out of it, which we did, and do a bunch of calculations and
simulations. So that was one thing we did. The other thing that was invented which is still,
there’s a legacy for that already here, and is the space system design course still here?
Yeah.
Okay so that’s still here.
The other thing was the small satellite conference was conceived that spring as a way to get
the community to continue to meet and talk. The first one was coordinated by the same three
guys. I sort of helped, as best I could, but wasn’t terribly involved with the organizing because
that was mostly working with the campus people. I believe that first Small Sat Conference, if
I’m not mistaken, something like 30 people showed up. It was held in the little theatre, you
know, I don’t know where it was, in the Eccles or somewhere but there is a little theatre where
they do little plays and things that’s where we used it. It was just a real small lecture hall sort of.
Of course last year, it was the 24th year last year, I think it was 1200 people taking over the entire
student union building you know on the second floor so it’s really turned out to be a great thing.
The other thing I did in that time frame related to the Get Away Specials was after being
here about a month, month and a half, talking with Scott Thomas and some of the other students
and some of the professors that were involved with these Get Away Specials, anecdotally I could
appreciate that there were quite a few that had failed. The experiments just didn’t work or they
had serious problems. I thought it was kind of a useful thing to maybe just put together a list of
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all the Get Away Specials that had been launched on the Shuttle and then try to understand
which experiments were inside of each one of them and then get the results for those experiments
and write it all up as sort of a summary so that the students here especially could benefit from all
those lessons learned. I naively thought that that would be about a two week effort. So I jumped
into, back then with the Shuttle down and everything in ciaos, I could literally come in the
morning at 8 o’clock and work as late as I wanted. Until 6 o’clock in the evening or whatever, 8
o’clock in the evening with no interruption whatsoever, just totally focused time. There were no
distractions. So I started jumping into that and the first thing I realized was NASA Goddard,
who ran the Get Away Special Program, had a list of Get Away Specials that had been launched.
But it wasn’t accurate. I could tell just from looking at that list versus the list the Air Force kept,
which was a separate list, and then the Johnson Space Center with the Shuttle Program had their
own list. All three lists didn’t compare very well. Generally I could tell there were seventy or so
canisters that had been launched. But the range between those lists was, like one was in the
eighties and one was in the sixties, they were way off. So I said ok first thing I need to do is to
verify how many canisters have been launched. That took me about two months. I literally got
to the point where I had these lists in front of me and I kind of merged them together as I
correlated them. Then I started comparing that list with images taken of the Shuttle cargo bay at
the launch site where the doors are open. I could see canisters in the cargo bay, but they weren’t
all listed on the list, that kind of stuff. So I had to call people and say ok what was that other
canister in there, why isn’t it on the list? Well it turns out that was first aid covers from the US
Postal Office and no one wanted to put that on the list, but I put it on the list anyway. So the
bottom line is, after about three months, I finally got a list I believed in that had both the
canisters and the experiments in it and most of the results.
The bottom line was pretty surprising to both Gil and everybody here that was involved.
The bottom line was there was something like seventy-seven canisters launched, about half of
them had active experiments in them. Half of those active experiments completely failed, just
spectacular failure, nothing happened. Then of the other half of the experiments that were active,
which were about a quarter of all of them, half of those had serious anomalies or otherwise had
compromised objectives because something didn’t work but they bumbled through whatever
they were trying to do. Just a small fraction of these things actually worked the way they were
designed. So Gil suggested that I write all that up and present it at the annual Get Away Special
User Conference that was always held at Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland at the end of
the fall season, like in October or so. So I did that and finally presented all those results, sort of
unannounced, to Goddard. They didn’t know those were the results because they weren’t
keeping track of results. That’s one thing I realized. No one was keeping track of results at all.
So when I presented these it was pretty much of a “wet blanket” on this whole workshop because
the results were pretty disappointing. So at first, the Goddard managers in charge of the Get
Away Special Program actually were getting angry with me. Right after my talk, during the
question and answer session, they were getting angry with me and acting very defensive and very
a sense of denial like well it couldn’t be that bad. But fortunately Gil stood up and so did some
senior guy from NASA that appreciated all the results and they sort of stood up for me and said
hey listen, time out guys these are real results. Rex has all the back up information, he’s called
all these experimenters and you just have got to swallow the bad medicine and face up to the fact
that this program isn’t working as well as you thought. They really called them down on it. So
they calmed down and I actually had the chance a couple of years later to update that report with
some additional information and that’s sort of in the archives now. That’s part of the lessons
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learned up until Challenger blew up. It was a fun exercise mostly because I had so much time to
work it, I could actually do a good job and not get distracted. So that will be, if there’s not a
copy here already, I’ll make sure you get a copy for your archives. It’s useful information.
That’s one thing we are concerned about because everyone that is here now has no clue
about what ??? None of us.
Is that right. I’m pretty sure from the time that the Shuttle started launching two year later,
that would have been in ’88, late ’88, my understanding is that the total canister count went from
something like 77 or so to 150 or something. It almost doubled until they finally shut the
program off. But I don’t know anybody that’s kept track of all that second half, and there’s a lot
of good stuff in there. They did all sorts of satellite deployments and fancy stuff. But I don’t
know anybody that’s kept track of it. What happened was it became clear in the summer of ’86
that the Shuttle was going to be down for a long time. I came here to work for a small satellite
company not a campus environment, so I started getting itchy about staying here, not really
doing what I wanted to do. I had come up from Southern California and a friend of mine that
worked at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory appreciated that I was stuck here without a rudder, not
really doing what I wanted to do. He learned about an opportunity down there for me to work on
Voyager going to Neptune. That intrigued me so I actually left here in August of ’86 and started
working at JPL. It turns out that the same week that the Challenger blew up, just a couple of
days before that, Voyager went by Uranus. But because of the Challenger news that whole story
got buried. It almost didn’t get notice unfortunately. That same week both of those things
happened. So I continued my involvement with the Get Away Special folks here even after I
went to JPL for several more years because I fully appreciated what was possible here. As you
might expect at places like JPL to do anything small and simple is very hard to do and it takes a
lot of money and time.
So I actually, several years later, was involved in proto-typing some micro-spacecraft
concepts which were generally about Get Away Special size. These were for going to the Moon
and asteroids. I had become a fan of isogrid structures through a separate meeting with a guy
who knew all about those. I told Gil Moore that I would like to have a student up here actually
help me design and build a micro-satellite structure built out of isogrid. Gil thought it was a
great idea, so he arranged to have a masters student use that as his masters thesis. A mechanical
engineering student, his name was Joe Greathouse. So I got the funding and the funds were put
up here on campus and Joe started this thing. We sketched out what we wanted to do and he, one
of the main things that I wanted him to try to do was keep track of every single cent spent both in
his time and materials and machining time everything else to tell me how much it cost to build
this thing, design and build it. So he finished the whole thing in about four or five months and
just to make the point I asked him to FedEx it to me at my office at JPL when he was all done
with it. Which he did. It was sitting on my chair one day at the office in a FedEx box. It turned
out the whole thing cost from start to finish $2,000.00. This isogrid you know when it is first
machined it looks like it’s gold plated. It looks very fancy. I would take this isogrid structure
around to different places at JPL and I would put it on someone’s desk who I was pretty sure was
sort of a cynic of this sort of structure and I would say “ok tell me how much this cost.” They
would look at it and say that has to be at least $100,000.00, maybe $200,000.00. I had a little
price tag on it that attached to it. I would keep it flipped over one way so that you couldn’t see
the price, then I would flip the price around and it was $2,000.00. It blew everybody away there.
It was nice that it worked so well with this project that Gil started asking other students to build
their trays for Get Away Specials out of this stuff and evidentially balloon payloads and full
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blown satellites buses and stuff. So now it’s all over the place. It’s very satisfying to see that it’s
not only here but at other campuses. I think it vindicates what I had in mind back then.
Question: One thing that I don’t understand is how they release the satellites from the Get Away
Special payloads on the Shuttle. Do you know how that works?
The early one had a, the canisters are what about three feet high maybe? A meter or
something? The early ones probably used about 20% of that volume for a pedestal in there
which was a really beefy three-legged aluminum structure that came up like a tripod with a really
thick base on it. On top of the base was a clamp-band assembly just like any other launch
vehicle would have and a fairly stiff spring. The clamp-band was attached to the circuitry that
went back into the cabin for the Shuttle. Of course to deploy a satellite you had to open a door
on the Get Away Special canister so that also had some switches and drive motor and stuff. The
crew in the Shuttle cockpit looking out through the back windows had a switch panel that
operated all these functions. So they would open the door at the right time, they would get the
orbiter situated at the right angle and orientation and then at the right time they would flip these
switches which would blow the clamp-band and the spring would eject the satellite out. I’m
pretty sure most of them used that technique. It’s just that over time they shrunk the form factor
of the clamp-band so it didn’t take up so much volume. That’s how it worked.
Question: Were you ever part of a Get Away Special road trip?
No, I heard about them, but I never was. I did have some fabulous conversations with
some these students who had built experiments when I was tracking down these results. From all
over the country, not just here at Utah State.
I remember talking to one student who said he was from Houston and their team was about
four students strong and they had an assignment with a launch date and everything at the Cape.
He said they were literally assembling the experiment for the final time in the backseat of the car
driving from Houston to the Cape. That’s how late they were with their test program. Crazy
stuff like that.
One of the payloads that failed was a really cool payload from Cal Tech that was going to
do multiple turntables inside, spinning at the rates that would simulate Mars, Lunar and Earth
gravity with seeds on them at different positions radially out on the turntable. They were going
to try to see what the threshold for gravity field was when the seeds start realizing they need to
turn their growth direction. It was a great experiment and they had tested this thing. It was
designed with a lot of help from JPLers. It was very robust and reliable, I thought it would work
great. I learned that the whole thing didn’t work at all up in orbit. So I called one of the
students, I said did you ever figure out why it didn’t work? He said yea, it’s very embarrassing.
All though our test program we tested the daylight out of the thing it was all ready to go and at
the Cape when they were doing the final closeout one of the students remembered they used the
same fuse during the whole test program. So he passed the idea around to his student team, why
don’t we change out the old fuse with a brand new one to make sure its just fresh and they said
great idea. Improve the chance of mission success. So they changed the fuse out but they put the
wrong size in. It was too small. The one they put in was too small. So what happened was as
soon as the crew flipped the switch to turn it on the fuse blew and the whole thing just stopped.
They got like a milla-second of data.
There was another one, a similar thing, one of the failures it was a multi-million dollar
experiment that McDonald Douglas in St. Louis put together. It was a fluid physics experiment.
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Really fancy, probably the fanciest one I ever saw. Likewise they launched the thing, they got it
back, they read the data out, and they said everything operated but there’s really is no data here.
It not doing what we thought it would do. We expected some more interesting results in microgravity. But all they saw was that all the switches worked and all the little motors worked and all
the fluid transfer functions worked, but it wasn’t working the way they thought. So they looked
into it, looked into it and they finally realized that everything worked, but the time it started
didn’t correlate with the launch time. It was actually earlier than the launch time. So they
looked back at the records at the Cape and it turned out that they had an acoustic switch installed
in the Get Away Special, which was one way they used to start them, which detected the noise
from the solid rocket boosters on the Shuttle. You know once the solids go, the Shuttle is
launching. That’s your key that you are really going. This acoustic switch was suppose to turn
on when the solids ignited. What they found out was that two week before launch when the Get
Away Special was in the hanger where they integrate with the Shuttle it was just waiting for it’s
slot for integration and that day a Delta II rocket took off from the Cape. The noise from that is
what triggered the acoustic switch. So that was very embarrassing. Stuff like that.
One thing I found out from all those experiment failures was generally, the general cause
was a poorly executed integrated test program, environmental test program for the whole
experiment. That’s generally where things fell apart. They would have a great design. They
would assemble it and all that, but a lot of these teams got time crunched at the end because their
development took too long so their test program was truncated somehow and they just didn’t test
as much as they should have. So controllers didn’t work, batteries didn’t work, memories didn’t
work, heaters didn’t work and that all compromises things when that doesn’t happen right. That
was interesting. So that’s where we are with that.
I could say a couple of things that are interesting for context. One is this fat can idea I
mentioned. There was going to be a contract from Utah State University to Morton Thiokol, up
here in Brigham City, or wherever it is. It turns out the morning of the Challenger accident I was
at the Thiokol executive conference room with Gil Moore. He had called a meeting which was
with all of the key decision makers at Thiokol, and me and Rex Megill here from the campus,
and one grad student that was going to work on the fat can from mechanical engineering. We
were there that morning to negotiate the contract for Thiokol, you know the scope and the price
and everything. We were going to negotiate and get a contract signed. Surprisingly this was
only about the 25th Shuttle mission. There must have been a dozen people in the room and
everybody to a person that morning forgot there was a Shuttle mission that morning because it
was so routine by then. So what happen was we are right in the middle of these thick discussions
about contract language and stuff and Gill Moore’s executive assistant comes in and puts her
hand on his shoulder and doesn’t say a word, she just looks at him. They had been working
together for years and years and so she knew him really well and vice versa. She just gives him
this funny look and then nodded her head like come with me. So he said excuse me gentlemen,
apparently something important has come up. So he goes out in the hall and he disappears for
about 30 seconds. Then you hear this gasp out of Gil Moore and I frankly thought that he had
just been told that his wife had gotten seriously injured or killed in an accident or something.
That’s what it sounded like. So another minute goes by and then he comes back in. He’s clearly
very unsettled and he kind of composes himself and says gentlemen I have to call this meeting
closed. There’s been a terrible accident at the launch site for the Shuttle this morning and he
says all personnel on board were killed. He says we’re going to have to do other things today
than this meeting. So he just called the meeting off right then. So we all filtered out of the room
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and tried to find a TV because back then it wasn’t very common that you could find a TV in
building like that. This was before the internet, before flat screen TVs, even before Direct TV
and all those things. So it turns out one secretary down the hall somewhere had like a news radio
station from Salt Lake City on and that was giving real time news reports on things. So we
realized how bad it was fairly quickly. Gil Moore, in the meantime, one of his jobs out there was
to do public relations liaisons with the media whenever there was something important to talk
about. He was the person for Thiokol. He had to sort of change his spots like Clark Kent and
become the PR guy. The news trucks were on their way up from Salt Lake City up to the site,
racing out there to get the first hand word from Thiokol and what happened. So not knowing
anything about what actually happened, Gil had to stand in front of all these reporters with their
microphones and cameras and try to explain what happened, not knowing what happened. It was
very awkward, but Gil handled it pretty well, very poised and sounded very professional and
kind of kept everybody at ease. He though he didn’t know anything about what had happened,
so that was very cool. It was a very surreal day because everything just completely, you know
everybody’s plans changed in one day. Really weird.
Question: Is there anything else you would like to add to this?
Well there’s one little antidote which to me captures Gil Moore perfectly. The context is
once the Shuttle stood down and looked like it was clearly going to be down for at least a year or
maybe two years, and safety, of course, became the number one priority all across NASA was
we got to get this thing safe again. There were rumbling to cancel anything that was really not
mission critical to the Shuttle program. There was an upswell of support for a while to cancel
the Get Away Special Program completely and just get rid of these things because they don’t
really add to the core mission of the Shuttle. So Gil, of course, took that as a personal challenge
to make sure it didn’t get canceled. At the time the NASA administrator was Dan Goldman, who
was a fairly brusque former spy satellite guy from the, what used to be called TRW, that is
Northrup Grumman in Rondo Beach. He mostly worked in the classified world all of his career.
He was a PhD level guy, really smart and everything, had a huge ego and turns out that it was
very difficult to just get a meeting with Dan Goodman because he had all these people around
him that would buffer him from normal people. Very difficult to get a meeting or a phone call, a
difficult guy to approach and get some time with. Gil figured if he could just get a meeting with
Dan Goldman he could convince him, pretty much on the spot, that this program was worth
saving and shouldn’t be canceled, but he needed a meeting with Dan Goldman. First he tried
calling Dan Goldman’s number at NASA headquarters. Of course he gets two or three levels of
assistants and assistants to assistants to keep Gil from talking to Dan Goldman. So he tried for a
month to do that and never could even get a call scheduled with Dan Goldman. Then he tried
letters. So he started sending letters directly to Dan Goldman. They wouldn’t even get opened
typically. He started sending them to friends of his who would walk them down the hall and put
them on Dan Goldman’s desk or his assistant’s desk and nothing ever happened there. So
months went by and nothing was converging. So in classic Gil style he finally decided, he said
listen, he said I’m not going to get in to Dan Goldman through the official channels. So he said I
know this guy is invited every month to go give a lecture or a speech somewhere. I’m going to
track him down at one of these lectures and figure out how to get to him there. So he started
getting information on where Dan Goldman was going to be appearing at different space
conferences and what not. I think there was finally one in Anaheim or somewhere in California,
or possibly Las Vegas, I forget exactly where it was but Gil figured he would use that one as one
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of his opportunities. He went to this conference and he started basically stalking Dan Goldman.
He’s going to get a word with Dan Goldman some way or another. It turns out that even on
travel Dan Goldman has this entourage with him that would keep people away from him unless
they were scheduled to meet with him. So it’s the same old problem. In typical Gil style he
figures ok I’m not going to get to him this way either, but he says I know one thing about Dan
Goldman, sooner or later he’s got to go the restroom just like every other human being. So what
he did was camp out near the restroom, the men’s restroom at this conference and he waited until
Dan Goldman went to the restroom and then he went in. He got right next to him. It sounds like
he was right next to him at the urinals and that’s when he gave him the pitch. The quick you’ve
got to save this program. Dan you can’t let it die and he wouldn’t let him leave the restroom
until he committed to save the program. It worked. Goldman assigned an action item to one of
his staff and they finally worked it and got the official paperwork in place to keep the program
alive. That just gives you an idea of how Gil can always, you know, when he wants his way
he’ll get it some way or another. Just a great little story about him.
Question: Is there anything else?
Just that I’m delighted to see that the program is still pretty vibrant here even though there
is not going to be any more Shuttles. I’m anxious to see how it gets converted over to something
that routinely launches on other vehicles. So that’s important. I’m glad to hear that the space
system design class is still going. That’s great. As you know small satellites are going to keep
going probably forever. So good stuff. So that’s it.
Thank you for sitting down with us.
Yeah.

